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Classical physics is generally regarded as deterministic, as opposed to quantum mechanics that is considered
the first theory to have introduced genuine indeterminism into physics. We challenge this view by arguing
that the alleged determinism of classical physics relies on the tacit, metaphysical assumption that there exists
an actual value of every physical quantity, with its infinite predetermined digits (which we name principle of
infinite precision). Building on recent information-theoretic arguments showing that the principle of infinite
precision (which translates into the attribution of a physical meaning to mathematical real numbers) leads to
unphysical consequences, we consider possible alternative indeterministic interpretations of classical physics.
We also link those to well-known interpretations of quantum mechanics. In particular, we propose a model of
classical indeterminism based on finite information quantities (FIQs). Moreover, we discuss the perspectives
that an indeterministic physics could open (such as strong emergence), as well as some potential problematic
issues. Finally, we make evident that any indeterministic interpretation of physics would have to deal with the
problem of explaining how the indeterminate values become determinate, a problem known in the context of
quantum mechanics as (part of) the “quantum measurement problem”. We discuss some similarities between
the classical and the quantum measurement problems, and propose ideas for possible solutions (e.g., “collapse
models” and “top-down causation”).
WHY IS CLASSICAL PHYSICS (IN)DETERMINISTIC?
It is generally accepted that classical physics (i.e., New-
ton’s mechanics and Maxwell’s electrodynamics) is determin-
istic. Restating a famous argument due to Laplace (known as
Laplace’s demon), determinism is usually assumed to be the
“view that a sufficient knowledge of the laws of nature and
appropriate boundary conditions will enable a superior intelli-
gence to predict the future states of the physical world and to
retrodict its past states with infinite precision” [1].
Yet, stimulated by the development of statistical physics
(which is taken to introduce indeterminacy as merely epis-
temic), one could find notable exceptions to this determinis-
tic view, remarkably in the works of preeminent physicists
the likes of L. Boltzmann, F. Exner, E. Schro¨dinger and M.
Born, who –admittedly with different standpoints– all argued
for genuine indeterminism in classical physics (see [2] and
references thereof). These doubts about classical determinism
were fostered in the second half of the twentieth century, after
the theory of chaotic systems was systematically developed
and its implications fully understood [3, 4].
However, it is only in recent years that new life has been
breathed into the critique of determinism in classical physics,
showing that the advocacy of determinism leads to severe con-
ceptual difficulties based on information-theoretic arguments
[5–7], and that determinism might even be incompatible with
the derivation of the second law of thermodynamics [8]. In
fact, the hypothetical “superior intelligence” (demon), sup-
posedly able to perfectly predict the future, is required to have
complete information about the state of the universe and then
use it to compute the subsequent evolution. Recent devel-
opments of information theory and its application to physics
(mainly blossomed within the frameworks of quantum infor-
mation and quantum thermodynamics) led to the conclusion
that the abstract, mathematically well-formalized concept of
information acquires a meaningful value in the natural sci-
ences only if the information is embodied into a physical
system (encoding), allowing it to be manipulated (computa-
tion) and transmitted (communication). As such, these pro-
cesses are subject to the same limitations imposed by the laws
of physics (Landauer’s principle [9]). In the face of this,
Laplace’s demon, and hence determinism, leads to two cat-
egories of problems: the problem of infinities and the problem
of infinitesimals.1
The former of these problems is directly related to the mem-
ory capability of the physical systems that are supposed to
encode the information of the whole Universe, then to be ma-
nipulated to compute the subsequent evolution. About this,
Blundell concludes: “If such a demon were (even hypothet-
ically) to be constructed in our physical world, it would be
subject to physical constraints which would include a limit on
the number of atoms it could contain, bounded from above by
the number of particles in the observable Universe. [...] Hence
there is insufficient physical resource in the entire Universe to
allow for the operation of a Laplacian demon able to analyze
1 Similar problems have been recently discussed in a more general context
and without resort to information-theoretic arguments in Ref. [10].
2even a relatively limited macroscopic physical system” [7].2
The problem of infinitesimals, instead, is related to the
question of whether it would be possible to know, even in
principle, the necessary boundary conditions with infinite pre-
cision.3 Moreover, do these infinite-precision conditions (i.e.,
with infinite predetermined digits) exist at all? As Drossel
pointed out, this is related to the problem of determinism in so
far as the “idea of a deterministic time evolution represented
by a trajectory in phase space can only be upheld within the
framework of classical mechanics if a point in phase space has
infinite precision” [8]. To address the problem of infinites-
imals, and in doing so challenging determinism both at the
epistemic and ontic levels, one can again use an argument
that relates information and physics, namely the fact that fi-
nite volumes can contain only a finite amount of information
(Bekenstein bound, see [6]).
In this respect, one should realize that classical physics is
not inherently deterministic just because its formalism is a set
of deterministic functions (differential equations), but rather
its alleged deterministic character is based on the metaphys-
ical, unwarranted assumption of “infinite precision”. Such a
hidden assumption can be formulated as a principle –tacitly
assumed in classical physics– which consists of two different
aspects:
Principle of infinite precision:
1. (Ontological) – there exists an actual value of every phys-
ical quantity, with its infinite determined digits (in any arbi-
trary numerical base).
2. (Epistemological) – despite it might not be possible to
know all the digits of a physical quantity (through measure-
ments), it is possible to know an arbitrarily large number of
digits.
In this paper, we further develop the argument put forward
in Ref. [6], wherein it has been outlined a concrete possibil-
ity to replace the principle of infinite precision. According
to this view, the limits of this principle rely on the faulty as-
sumption of granting a physical significance to mathematical
real numbers. We would like to stress that such an assump-
tion cannot be whatsoever justified at the operational level, as
already stressed by Born, as early as 1955: “Statements like
‘a quantity x has a completely definite value’ (expressed by
a real number and represented by a point in the mathematical
continuum) seem to me to have no physical meaning” [12].
Relaxing the assumption of the physical significance of math-
ematical real numbers, allows one to regard classical physics
2 The problem with (physical) infinities is connected to the so-called
Hilbert’s Hotel paradox, proposed by D. Hilbert in 1924 [11]. This para-
dox illustrates the possibility for a hypothetical hotel with (countably) infi-
nite rooms, all of which already occupied, to allocate (countably) infinitely
many more guests.
3 In what follows, boundary and initial conditions will be used interchange-
ably, for they are conceptually the same in our discussion. In fact, they both
serve as necessary inputs to the (differential) dynamical equations in order
to give predictions. Thus, if either of the initial or the boundary condi-
tions are not determined with infinite precision, they affect the subsequent
dynamics in the same way.
as a fundamentally indeterministic theory, contrarily to its
standard formulation. The latter can be considered, in this
view, a deterministic completion in terms of (tacitly) posited
hidden variables. This situation resembles (without however
being completely analogous) the contraposition between the
standard formulation of quantum mechanics –which consid-
ers indeterminism an irrefutable part of quantum theory– and
Bohm’s [13] or Gudder’s [14] hidden variable models, which
provide a deterministic description of quantum phenomena –
adding in principle inaccessible supplementary variables.
Before further discussing, in what follows, the arguments
for alternative interpretations of classical physics without real
numbers –and the issues that this can cause– some general
remarks on indeterminism seem due. It appears, in fact, that
a commonmisconception concerning physical indeterminism,
is that –in the eyes of some physicists and philosophers– this is
taken to imply that any kind of regularity or predictive power
looks unwarranted –the supporter of determinism would ask:
how can you explain the incredible predictive success of our
laws of physics without causal determinism? Yet, an indeter-
ministic description of the world does not (at least necessar-
ily) entail a “lawless indeterminism”, namely a complete dis-
order devoid of any laws or regularities (quantum mechanics
with its probabilistic predictions provides a prime example of
these indeterministic regularities). We would like to define in-
determinism trough the sufficient condition of the existence of
some events that are not fully determined by their past states;
in the words of K. Popper, “indeterminism merely asserts that
there exists at least one event (or perhaps, one kind of events
[...]) which is not predetermined” [15]. Such a remark is im-
portant because, historically, classical mechanics allowed to
predict with a tremendous precision the motion, for instance,
of the planets in the Solar System and this led Laplace to for-
mulate his ideas on determinism, which became the standard
view among physicists and remained for a long time unchal-
lenged. In fact, thinking that physics is deterministic seems
completely legit, in so far as certain physical systems exhibit
extremely stable dynamics –e.g. an harmonic oscillator (pen-
dulum), or the (Newtonian) gravitational two-body problem,
and in general any integrable systems. However, this justifi-
cation of determinism can be challenged on the basis of two
considerations. On the one hand, as already remarked, the ex-
istence of some very stable systems (for all practical purposes
treated as deterministic) does not undermine the possibility of
indeterminism in the natural world. On the other hand, in the
last one century a systematic study of chaotic systems –which
are not integrable– has been carried out, giving us good rea-
sons to doubt determinism. Indeed, chaotic systems are not
stable under perturbations, meaning that an arbitrarily small
change in the initial conditions would lead to a significantly
different future behavior, thus making the principle of infinite
precision even more operationally unjustified, and therefore
3representing a concrete challenge to determinism.4
Incidentally, it is interesting to stress that, in the context of
quantum physics, Bell’s inequalities [16] have given us good
reasons to believe, if not directly in indeterminism –which in-
deed cannot be confirmed or disproved within the domain of
science (see further)– that having at least one not predeter-
mined event in the history of the Universe could have tremen-
dous consequences on the following evolution. In fact, an
experimental violation of Bells inequalities guarantees that
if the inputs (measurement settings) were independent of the
physical state shared by two distant parties, then the outcomes
would be genuinely random (i.e., they cannot have predeter-
mined values). Yet, the amount of random numbers gener-
ated in a Bell’s test can be greater than the number of the
corresponding inputs (in terms of bits of information): Bell’s
tests performed on quantum entangled states can be thought
of as machines to increase the amount of randomness in the
Universe (see also [17]). Surprisingly enough, recent results
[18, 19] showed that it is not even necessary to have a sin-
gle genuinely random bit from the outset, but it is sufficient
to introduce an arbitrarily small amount of initial random-
ness (i.e., of measurement independence) to generate virtu-
ally unbounded randomness. Hence, if one single event in the
past history of the Universe was not fully causally determined
beforehand, there is an operationally well defined procedure
that allows to arbitrarily multiply the amount of indetermin-
istic events in the future. Namely, it would be enough to use
the randomness of the one indeterminate event as input in a
Bell’s test to extract more randomness (through the violation
of a Bell’s inequality). The random outputs can be used as
new inputs for more Bell’s experiments, and the process can
be repeated arbitrarily many times [20]. However, the initial
arbitrarily small amount of randomness (or of indeterministic
events) cannot be demonstrated by physics and its justification
can only come from metaphysical arguments (see [21]).
FORMS OF INDETERMINISM IN CLASSICAL AND
QUANTUM PHYSICS
Before proposing some possible models of indeterministic
classical physics, in this section we shortly discuss some gen-
eral features of deterministic and indeterministic theories. In
doing so we aim at clarifying possible similarities between
classical and quantum physics. Both classical and quantum
mechanics are, in fact, formalized by a set of differential equa-
tions (laws of motion) that govern the dynamics of systems,
together with appropriate initial conditions (IC) that fix the
4 Sometimes a distinction is made between strong and weak determinism.
The former can be intuitively defined as “similar initial conditions lead
to similar trajectories and it is fulfilled by any integrable system. On the
other hand, weak determinism can be defined as “identical conditions lead
to identical trajectories. This holds for classical chaotic systems, however it
is not empirically testable, for it would require the knowledge of the initial
conditions with infinite precision.
free parameters of these equations. Thus, if one aims at elimi-
nating determinism as an unfounded interpretational element,
there seems to be different possibilities, either involving the
laws of physics or the characterization of the IC:
1. The laws of motions are fundamentally stochastic. In
this case, however, we cannot speak of an interpretation of
the theory, but an actual modification of the formalism is re-
quired. In fact, in this case not only chaotic systems but also
integrable ones would exhibit noisy outcomes, leading to ex-
perimentally inequivalent predictions. This case is the ana-
logue of spontaneous collapse theories in quantum mechanics
[22–25], which modify the Schro¨dinger’s equation with addi-
tional non-unitary terms.
2. The IC cannot, in principle, be fully known. Without
any ontological commitments, one can take seriously the epis-
temological statements of the principle of infinite precision
and push it to the extreme, namely asserting that there are in
principle limits to the possibility of knowing (or measuring)
certain quantities. This is what is entailed by the standard
interpretation of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle that is
usually stated as: there is in quantum physics a fundamental
limit to the precision with which canonically conjugated vari-
ables can be known. Such an uncertainty can be introduced
in classical physics as well, and would be characterized by a
new natural constant ε (e.g., the standard deviation of a Gaus-
sian function centered in the considered point). This would set
an epistemic (yet fundamental) limit of precision, with which
physical variables could be determined, as a classical ana-
logue of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations in quantum the-
ory. This viewpoint appears similar to the one proposed in
Ref. [8]. Notice, however, that since this approach is agnostic
with respect to the underlying ontology, it is fully compatible
with a realist position that takes this uncertainty as being an
ontological indeterminacy. 5 (such as in weather forecasts).
So more general arguments than theoretical reduction would
be desirable.
3. The IC are not fully determined. One can think that the
fundamental limit of precision in determining physical quan-
tities is not merely epistemic, but actually is an objective, on-
tologic indeterminacy that depends on the system and its in-
teractions at a certain time. This view is the one that will be
pursued in what follows, when we will propose ways to re-
move real numbers R from the domain of physics. Although
this case does not seem to be the analogue of any specific in-
terpretation of quantum theory, it clearly goes in the direction
5 As a supporting argument for this fundamental epistemic limit, one can
even think in terms of theoretical reduction (i.e. when a theory is super-
vened by a more fundamental one, of which it represent an approxima-
tion). In fact, determining positions in classical physics with higher and
higher precision, means to access digits that are relevant at the microscopic
scale, and thus the Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relations need to be applied
(leading to the identification ε = ~). However, it ought to be remarked that
in certain classical chaotic systems the digits that are to become relevant
are not necessarily the ones in the microscopic domain, but could be those
which will become relevant only after a longer time
4of realistic interpretations. It ought to be stressed, however,
that if the initial conditions are not fully determined, this even
makes (quantum) Bohmian mechanics becoming indetermin-
istic.
INDETERMINISTIC CLASSICAL PHYSICS WITHOUT
REAL NUMBERS
In Ref. [6], a model of indeterministic classical mechanics
has been sketched, which, while leaving the dynamical equa-
tions unchanged, proposes a critical revision of the assump-
tions on the initial condition. In this view, the standard inter-
pretation of classical mechanics has always tacitly assumed
as hidden variables the predetermined values taken by physi-
cal quantities in the domain of mathematical real numbers, R.
The physical existence of an infinite amount of predetermined
digits could lead to unphysical situations, such as the afore-
mentioned infinite information density, as explained in detail
in Refs. [5] and [6].
In this section, we discuss some possible solutions to elim-
inate these unwanted features, namely possible ways of car-
rying out the relaxation of the postulate according to which
physical quantities take values in the real numbers. These so-
lutions are however intended to be merely different interpreta-
tions of classical mechanics, i.e. they ought to be empirically
indistinguishable from the standard predictions (in the same
way as interpretations of quantum mechanics are) [26].
1. “Truncated real numbers”.
A first possibility is to consider physical variables as taking
values in a set of “truncated real numbers”. This, as already
noted by Born, would ensure the empirical indistinguishabil-
ity from the standard classical physics: “a statement like x= pi
cm would have a physical meaning only if one could distin-
guish between it and x = pin cm for every n, where pin is the
approximation of pi by the first n decimals. This, however,
is impossible; and even if we suppose that the accuracy of
measurement will be increased in the future, n can always be
chosen so large that no experimental distinction is possible”
[12]. If one, however, wishes to attribute an ontological value
to such an interpretation has to identify n with a new univer-
sal constant, that, independent of how big it could be, sets a
limitation to the length of physically significant numbers, ul-
timately including the life of the Universe, if time too is to be
considered a physical quantity. Another problematic issue is
that nwould be dependent on the units in which one expresses
the considered physical variables. This leads to consider a sec-
ond possible solution.
2. Rational numbers.
Another possibility is to consider that physical quantities
take value in the rational numbers, Q. Even if this sounds
somewhat strange, one can argue that, in practice, physical
measurements are in fact only described by rational numbers.
For instance, a measurement of length is obtained by compar-
ing a rod that has been carefully divided into equal parts (i.e.
a ruler) with the object to be measured and determining the
best fit within its (rational) divisions. And even probabilities
are obtained as limits of frequencies of events’ occurrences
(i.e. ratios of counts). However, while rational numbers do
eliminate the unwanted infinite information density, they do
not seem to remove determinism in so far as all the digits are
fully predetermined. Moreover, the use of rational numbers
leads to those that can be named “Pitagora’s no-go theorems”.
Indeed, positing a physics based on rational numbers, would
rule out the possibility of constructing a physical object with
the shape of a perfect square with unit edge or a perfect circle
with unit diameter. In fact, by means of elementarymathemat-
ical theorems, their diagonal and circumference, respectively,
would measure
√
2 and pi, hence resulting to be physically un-
acceptable. Additionally, if one plugs in the equations of mo-
tion initial conditions and time both taking values in the ratio-
nal numbers, the solutions are not in general rational numbers.
These problematic issues lead to consider yet another possible
solution.
3. “Computable real numbers”.
A further alternative is to substitute the domain of phys-
ically meaningful numbers from (mathematically) real num-
bers to the proper subset thereof of “computable real num-
bers”; that is, to keep all real numbers deprived of the ir-
rational, uncomputable ones. In fact, even irrational, com-
putable real numbers can encode at most the same amount
of non-trivial information (in bits) as the length of the short-
est algorithm used to output their bits (i.e., the Kolmogorov
complexity). Uncomputable real numbers are in this model
instead substituted by genuinely random numbers, thus in-
troducing fundamental randomness also in classical physics.
These numbers, together with chaotic systems, lay the founda-
tions of an alternative classical indeterministic physics, which
removes the paradox of infinite information density. How-
ever, this proposal could be considered an ad hoc solution,
since it maintains a field of mathematical numbers as physi-
cally significant, but removes “by hand” those that are prob-
lematic (which admittedly are almost all).
4. “Finite information quantities” (FIQs).
Developing further the proposal in [6], we put forward an
alternative class of random numbers which are for all practi-
cal purposes (in terms of empirical predictions) equivalent to
5real numbers, but that have actually zero overlap with them
(they are not a mathematical number field, nor a proper subset
thereof). We refer to them as “finite-information quantities”
(FIQs). In order to illustrate this possible alternative solu-
tion to overcome the problems with the principle of infinite
precision, let us consider again the standard interpretation in
greater formal detail. A physical quantity γ (which may be the
scalar parameter time, a universal constant, as well as a one-
dimensional component of the position or of the momentum,
etc.) is assumed to take values in the domain of real numbers,
i.e., γ ∈ R. Without loss of generality, but as a matter of sim-
plicity, let us consider γ to be between 0 and 1, and that its
digits (bits) are expressed in binary base:
γ = 0.γ1γ2 · · ·γ j · · · ,
where each γ j ∈ {0,1}, ∀ j ∈ N+. This means that, being γ ∈
R, its infinite bits are all given at once and each one of them
takes as a value either 0 or 1.
In an indeterministic world, however, not all the digits
should be determined at all times, yet we require this model to
give the same empirical predictions of the standard one. We
therefore require a physical quantity to have the first (more
significant) N digits fully determined –and to be the same as
those that give the standard deterministic predictions– at time
t, and we write γ(N(t)), whereas the following infinite digits
are not yet determined. This reads:
γ(N(t)) = 0.γ1γ2 · · ·γN(t)?N(t)+1 · · ·?k · · · ,
where each γ j ∈ {0,1}, ∀ j ≤ N(t), and the symbol ?k here
means that the kth digit is a not yet actualized binary digit
(see further).
Despite the element of randomness introduced, the transi-
tion between the actualized values and the random values still
to be realized does not need to be a sharp one. In fact, one
can conceive an objective property that quantifies the (possi-
bly unbalanced) disposition of every digit to take one of the
two possible values, 0 or 1. This property is reminiscent of
Popper’s propensities [27],6 and it can be seen as the element
of objective reality of this alternative interpretation:
Definition - propensities
There exist (in the sense of being ontologically real) physical
properties that we call propensities q j ∈ [0,1]∩Q, for each
digit j of a physical quantity γ(N(t)). A propensity quantifies
the tendency or disposition of the jth binary digit to take the
value 1.
The interpretation of propensities can be understood start-
ing from the limit cases. If the propensities are 0 or 1 the
meaning is straightforward. For example, q j = 1 means that
the jth digit will take value 1 with certainty. On the opposite
6 While propensities were for Popper an interpretation of mathematical prob-
abilities proper, we are not here necessarily requiring them to satisfy Kol-
mogorov’s axioms, as discussed in Ref. [28].
extreme, if a bit has an associated propensity of 1/2, it means
that the bit is totally random. Namely, if one were to mea-
sure the value of this bit, there would be an intrinsic property
that makes it taking the value 0 or 1 with equal likelihood (we
don’t use “probability” to avoid formal issues, see footnote
6). All the intermediate cases can then be constructed. For in-
stance, a propensity qk = 0.3 means that there is an objective
tendency of the kth digit to take the value 1, quantified by 0.3,
and thus the complementary propensity of taking the value 0
would be 0.7 (how this actualization occurs is an open issue,
as we discuss in the next section). We would like to stress that
while we assume propensities to be an (ontic) objective prop-
erty, at the operational level they lead to the measured (epis-
temic) frequencies, but they supervene frequencies insofar as
propensities can describe single-time events.
red We posit that propensities take values in the domain of
rational numbers such that they contain only a finite amount
of information. Hence, postulating them as an element of re-
ality, does not lead to the same information paradoxes of real
numbers. It also follows from the definition, that the propen-
sities q j for the first N(t) digits of a quantity γ(N(t)) at time t
are all either 0 or 1, i.e. q j ∈ {0,1}, ∀ j ∈ [1,N(t)].
As a function of time, propensities must undergo a dynami-
cal evolution. We envision more than a way to evolve propen-
sities in time, although we do not propose an explicit model
to describe this. On the one hand, one can think of a dynam-
ical process similar to spontaneous collapse models of quan-
tum mechanics. Admittedly, spontaneous collapse models re-
quire to modify the fundamental dynamical equation of quan-
tum physics, the Schro¨dinger’s equation. Hence these mod-
els are not merely interpretations, but testable different theo-
ries. Nevertheless, for propensity this is not necessarily the
case because they are a postulated element of reality which is
however not observable. Thus, even if it would be desirable
to have an explicit form for the equations governing the dy-
namics of propensities, the measured values of physical (ob-
servable) quantities would evolve in the usual way. Thus we
maintain that our proposed new interpretation is indeed an in-
terpretation and not a different testable theory.
On the other hand, intuitionistic mathematics could be the
tool to solve the issue of the evolution of propensities (see
“choice sequences” below). In fact, one can start from an infi-
nite sequence of completely random bits (or digits), and then
the number representing a physical quantity evolves according
to a law (a function of these random bits). However, despite
this law would describe the evolution of propensities, it is dif-
ferent from a standard a physical law, for it is a different way
to construct mathematical numbers –which in turn describe
physical quantities– in time.
Making use of propensities, we can now refine our defini-
tion of physical quantities:
Definition - FIQs
A finite-information quantity (FIQ) is an ordered list of
propensities {q1,q2, · · · ,q j, · · · }, that satisfies:
1. (necessary condition): The information content is finite,
i.e. ∑ j I j < ∞, where I j = 1−H(q j) is the information content
6of the propensity, and H is the binary entropy function of its
argument. This ensures that the information content of FIQs
is bounded from above;
2. (sufficient condition): After a certain threshold, all
the bits are completely random, i.e. ∃M(t) ∈ N such that
q j =
1
2
, ∀ j >M(t)
It ought to be stressed that this view grants a prior fun-
damentality to the potential property of becoming actual (a
list of propensities, FIQ), more that to the already actualized
number (a list of determined bits). In fact, the analogue of a
pure state in this alternative interpretation of classical physics
would be a collection of all the FIQs associated with the dy-
namical variable (i.e., the list of the propensities of each digit).
Namely, this represents the maximal piece of information re-
garding a physical system. Yet, even having access to this
knowledge (which is admittedly not possible due to the fact
that propensities are not measurable) would lead to in princi-
ple unpredictable different evolutions. Thus, two systems that
are identical at a certain instant of time (in the sense that they
are in the same pure state, i.e. the propensities associated to
their variables are all the same) will have, in general, different
observable behaviors at later times. However, the merit of this
view is that the bits are realized univocally and irreversibly as
time passes, but the information content of a FIQ is always
bounded, contrarily to that of a real number. A physical quan-
tity γ reads in this interpretation as follows:
γ(N(t),M(t)) = 0. γ1γ2 · · ·γN(t)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
determined γ j∈{0,1}
?k , with qk∈(0,1)
︷ ︸︸ ︷
?N(t)+1 · · ·?M(t) ?M(t)+1 · · ·
︸ ︷︷ ︸
?l , with ql=
1
2
.
Notice that none of the FIQs is a mathematical number, but
they capture the tendency (propensity) of each bit of a physical
quantity to take the value 0 or 1 at the following instant in
time. This admittedly leads to problematic issues, such as the
problem of how and when the actualization of the digits from
their propensity take place: it thus introduces the analogue of
the quantum measurement problem also in classical physics
(see further).
Moreover, FIQs partly even out the fundamental differ-
ences between classical and quantum physics, making both
of them indeterministic (and making so even Bohmian inter-
pretation).7 Table I compares some possible combinations of
deterministic and indeterministic interpretations of quantum
and classical physics.
7 There is yet another deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics,
the so-called many-worlds interpretation that grants physical reality to the
wave function of the Universe, which always evolve unitarily. If FIQs are
introduced in that interpretation, then the realization of all the values of
the bits would actually take place, each of which being real in a different
“world”.
5. “Choice sequences”.
Finite Information Quantities are not numbers in the usual
sense, because their digits are not all given at once. On the
contrary, the “bits” of FIQs evolve as time passes, they start
from the value 1
2
and evolve until they acquire a bit value of
either 0 or 1. In a nutshell, FIQs are processes that develop in
time. Interestingly, in intuitionistic mathematics, the contin-
uum is filled by “choice sequences”, as Brouwer, the father of
intuitionism, and followers named them [29]. This is not the
place to present intuitionistic mathematics (see, e.g., [30]), but
let us emphasize that this alternative to classical (Platonistic)
mathematics allows one to formalize “dynamical numbers”
that resemble much our FIQs [31]. Interestingly, using the
language of intuitionistic mathematics makes it much easier
to talk of indeterminism [32].
STRONG EMERGENCE
The argument for determinism seems to rely, to a certain
extent, on the tacit assumption of reductionism in its stronger
form of microphysicalism, i.e. the view that every entity and
phenomenon are ultimately reducible to fundamental interac-
tions between elementary building blocs of physics (e.g., par-
ticles). In fact, in a completely deterministic picture, every
particular phenomenon can be traced back to the interactions
between its primitive components, along a (finite) chain of
causally predetermined events. In this way any form of strong
emergence seems to be ruled out, and it becomes only appar-
ent (i.e. a weak or epistemic emergence). On the other hand,
admitting genuine randomness in the universe, allows in our
opinion the possibility of strong emergence.8
As a concrete example, consider the kinetic theory of gases. If
one starts from a molecular description of the ideal gas, from
the perspective of standard, deterministic classical mechan-
ics, the stochasticity is only epistemic (i.e. only an appar-
ent effect due to the lack of complete information regarding
positions and momenta of every single molecule). Thus, the
deterministic behavior of the law of the ideal gas is not ex-
pected to be a strong emergent feature, but solely a retrieving
at the macroscopic scale of the fundamental determinism of
the microscopic components. In the perspective of the alter-
native indeterministic interpretation (based on FIQs), instead,
the deterministic law of the ideal gas, ruling the behavior at
the macroscopic level, emerges as a novel and not reducible
8 For a definition of strong emergence, see, for instance, Ref. [33]: “We
can say that a high-level phenomenon is strongly emergent with respect to
a low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-
level domain, but truths concerning that phenomenon are not deducible
even in principle from truths in the low-level domain”.
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Newton’s equation
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Measurement postulate
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Newton’s equation
IC (position) ∈ R and |ψ〉 ∈ L2(RN)
Bohm’s guidance equation
Schro¨dinger’s equation
Many worlds interpretation (?)
TABLE I: A table comparing deterministic and indeterministic interpretations of classical and quantum physics. Note that the substitution of
FIQs in the place of real numbers makes not only classical physics indeterministic, but also Bohm’s interpretation of quantum physics (which
is usually taken to restore determinism).
feature, from fundamental randomness.9
Notice that the historical debate on the apparent incom-
patibility between Poincare´’s recurrence theorem and Boltz-
mann’s kinetic theory of gases does not arise in the frame-
work of FIQs. Poincare´’s recurrence theorem, in fact, states
that continuous-state systems (i.e., in which the state variables
change continuously in time) return to an arbitrarily small
neighborhood of the initial state in phase space. However,
Poincare´’s theorem relies on the fact that the initial state is
perfectly determined (i.e., it is a mathematical point identified
by a set of coordinates which take values in the real numbers)
in phase space. Thus in a FIQ-based alternative physics the
theorem simply cannot be derived. In fact, FIQs interpreta-
tion features genuinely irreversible physical processes.
Similarly, Drossel has recently pointed out that, in a physics
where it is impossible to determine points of phase space with
infinite precision, “the time evolution of thermodynamics is
undetermined by classical mechanics [...]. Thus, the second
law of thermodynamics is an emergent law in the strong sense;
it is not contained in the microscopic laws of classical me-
chanics” [8].
At this point one should ask oneself whether there are ex-
amples of emergence that possibly go beyond some form of
the law of large numbers. Admittedly, we are unsure about
this. Clearly, in all indeterministic physical theories, the law
of large numbers will play an important role and lead to some
stability and hence to some form of determinism at the larger
scale (or higher-level description). It seems that this question
is closely related to possible top-down causation, the topic of
the next section.
9 It is true that also the law of the ideal gas would not be perfectly determinis-
tic in a FIQ-based physics, however its stability makes it almost determin-
istic for all practical purposes, whereas at the microscopic level, chaotic
behaviors multiply the fundamental uncertainty of the single molecules.
TOP-DOWN CAUSATION
The idea of strong emergence, including emergent deter-
minism, is related to the concept of “top-down causation”
[34, 37]. In this view, microphysicalism is not necessarily
rejected ontologically (i.e., it admits that complex structures
are hierarchical modular compositions of simpler ones), but
the fact that the behavior of macroscopic events is fully de-
termined by the interactions of the macroscopic entities is
revised. Top-down causation maintains that the interactions
between microscopic entities do not causally supervene the
macroscopic phenomena, but rather it posits a mutual inter-
action where also the macroscopic (strongly emergent) laws
impose constraints on the behavior of their constituents. Note
that top-down causation requires indeterminism (at least at
the lower level of the constituents) to be in principle conceiv-
able [35]; this was already remarked by Popper, when stating:
“[A] higher level may exert a dominant influence upon a lower
level. For it seems that, were the universe per impossibile a
perfect determinist clockwork, there would be no heat produc-
tion and no layers and therefore no such dominating influence
would occur. This suggests that the emergence of hierarchical
levels or layers, and of an interaction between them, depends
upon a fundamental indeterminism of the physical universe.
Each level is open to causal influences coming from lower
and from higher levels” [36].
Concerning indeterministic interpretations of physical the-
ories, top-down causation could help to understand how the
determination of dynamical variables (i.e., the actualization of
their values) occurs in the context of indeterministic theories.
Namely, the reason why –and under what circumstances– a
single definite value is realized among all the possible ones.
In the FIQ-based indeterministic interpretation of classical
physics here introduced, this translates into the understand-
ing of how the bits of physical variables becomes fully deter-
8mined, namely how their propensities become either 0 or 1.
We envision two possible mechanisms that could explain the
actualization of the variables:
1. The actualizations happens spontaneously as time
passes. This view is compatible with reductionism and it
does not necessarily require any effects of top-down causa-
tion. Note that this mechanism resembles, in the context of
quantum mechanics, objective collapse models such as the
“continuous spontaneous localization” (CSL) [23, 25].
2. The actualization happens when a higher level requires
it. This means that when a higher level of description (e.g., the
macroscopic measurement apparatus) requires some physical
quantity pertaining to the lower-level description to acquire a
determined value, then the lower level must get determined. In
quantum mechanics a similar explanation is provided by the
Copenhagen interpretation and, more explicitly, by the model
in Ref. [37].
In fact, the latter mechanisms are strongly related to what
has been discussed at length in the context of quantum theory,
namely the long-standing “quantum measurement problem”.
This comprises the problem of “explaining why a certain out-
come –as opposed to its alternatives– occurs in a particular
run of an experiment” [38]. In fact, some of the most com-
monly accepted interpretations of quantum mechanics (e.g.
the Copenhagen interpretation) uphold the view that it is the
act of measurement to impose to microscopic (quantum) ob-
jects to actualize one determined value, out of the possible
ones.
Note that, despite it has been already remarked in the lit-
erature that every indeterministic theory has to deal with a
“measurement problem” (see e.g. [38]), it seems that there
has hardly been any consideration of this issue in the context
of other indeterministic theories than quantum mechanics. In
the next subsection we will discuss what we call, by analogy,
the “classical measurement problem’. We will then draw a
connection with top-down causation, and show how this could
help to shed light on this problem.
The “classical measurement problem”
It is a very corroborated experimental fact that if a quantity
is measured twice with the same instrument, we expect a cer-
tain amount of digits to remain unchanged, and it is essential
to scientific investigation that such a knowledge is intersubjec-
tively available (up to the digit corresponding to the measure-
ment accuracy). Moreover, if a more accurate measurement
instrument is utilized, we expect not only the previous digits
to remain unchanged, but also to determine some new digits
that then become intersubjectively available. How to recon-
cile this stability of the measured digits with a fundamental
uncertainty in the determination of a physical quantity? How
does potentiality become actuality?
In the proposed FIQ-based indeterministic interpretation of
classical physics, too, one has to carefully define how the dig-
its of physical quantities realize themselves from the propen-
sity of taking that (or another) possible value. Consider for
example the chaotic systems analyzed in [6] (a simplified ver-
sion of the baker’s map). One can then think of a “faster” dy-
namics that, at every time step, shifts the bits by not only one
digit toward the more significant position, but, say, it shifts
them by 1000 digits (or any other arbitrarily large finite num-
ber). This clearly entails that the rate of change of propen-
sities depends on the dynamical system under consideration,
and cannot be thought of as a universal constant of “spon-
taneous” actualization. A possible solution is to introduce a
model of measurement that makes the digits becoming actual
(and therefore stable) up to the corresponding precision. This
clearly resembles the solution to the quantum measurement
problem provided by the objective collapse models, such as
the CSL [23, 25] or the GRW [22, 24]. The latter model,
indeed, posits a modification of the standard Schro¨dinger’s
equation which accounts for a spontaneous random “collapse”
of the wave function, occurring with a certain natural rate.
Under certain assumptions, this model leads to a mechanism
that changes the rate of spontaneous collapse, which increases
linearly with the number of components of a system (thus dur-
ing a measurement the wave function of a microscopic system
in contact with a macroscopic apparatus collapses extremely
fast). An analogous solution can be in principle proposed
for the rate of actualization of the propensities that define the
FIQs. However, this seems to mean that the dynamical equa-
tions need to be modified (in the same fashion as the GWR
model modifies the Schro¨dinger’s equation), thus leading to a
different formalism and not only an interpretation.
Coming back to top-down causation, this could explain why
every time one performs a measurement the determined dig-
its remain stable. In fact, the act of a measurement can be
regarded as the direct action performed at the higher level
which imposes to the lower level to get determinate. This is
very similar to what is taken to be the solution to the quantum
measurement problem within the Copenhagen interpretation,
wherein the higher level is the macroscopic measurement ap-
paratus, whereas the lower level is the measured microscopic
system. However, this kind of solutions lacks a clear defini-
tion of what is to be considered a measurement and how to
identify higher and lower levels of description.
As a matter of fact, the “classical measurement problem”
here introduced remains so far unresolved, as well as the quan-
tum measurement problem and, more in general, the problem
of the actualization of physical variables in any indeterminis-
tic theory. Yet, it is desirable that the topic of the measure-
ment problem should find room in the debate on foundations
of physics, in more general discussions than those centered on
quantum mechanics only.
CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed arguments –primarily based on the mod-
ern application of information theory to the foundations of
physics– against the standard view that classical physics is
9necessarily deterministic. We have also discussed concrete
perspectives to reinterpret classical physics in an indetermin-
istic fashion. We have then compared our indeterministic pro-
posals with some interpretations of quantum physics. How-
ever, it seems clear that the empirical results of both classical
and quantum mechanics can fit in either a deterministic or in-
deterministic framework. Furthermore, there are compelling
arguments (see e.g., [6, 21, 39]) to support the view that the
same conclusion can be reached for any given physical theory
–a trivial way to make an indeterministic theory fully deter-
mined is to “complete” the theory with all the results of every
possible experiments that can be performed.
In conclusion, although the problem of determinism versus
indeterminism is in our opinion central to science, the hope
to resolve this problem within science itself has faded, and
this is ultimately to be decided on the basis of metaphysical
arguments.
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